Subdomain Takeover Auditor β€” Find Claimable DNS Records avatar

Subdomain Takeover Auditor β€” Find Claimable DNS Records

Pricing

from $2.50 / 1,000 results

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Subdomain Takeover Auditor β€” Find Claimable DNS Records

Subdomain Takeover Auditor β€” Find Claimable DNS Records

Find dangling DNS records pointing at decommissioned third-party services β€” the kind anyone can claim to hijack a subdomain of your brand for phishing. Discovers subdomains passively from certificate transparency, resolves CNAMEs, and confirms matches against a public takeover-fingerprint database.

Pricing

from $2.50 / 1,000 results

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0.0

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Developer

alaudin burki

alaudin burki

Maintained by Community

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Bookmarked

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Total users

1

Monthly active users

a day ago

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A team decommissions a service β€” an S3 bucket, a Heroku app, a GitHub Pages site β€” and forgets the DNS record pointing at it. That record now dangles: it resolves, but to a third-party resource nobody at the company owns anymore. Whoever claims that resource on the other service now controls a subdomain of a trusted brand.

That is used for credential phishing, cookie theft, and bypassing domain allowlists β€” and it happens constantly, because nobody owns stale DNS. AWS has published a threat spotlight on exactly this pattern.

Entirely passive. No scanning, no login, no port probing.

  1. Enumerate subdomains from certificate transparency (crt.sh). Public logs, not a scan β€” every subdomain that ever got a TLS certificate shows up here.
  2. Resolve CNAMEs over DNS-over-HTTPS. A lookup, not a probe.
  3. Match against a public takeover-fingerprint database (EdOverflow's can-i-take-over-xyz, 76 catalogued services). Only when a CNAME matches a known-vulnerable pattern is the already-public page fetched once, to confirm the exact string that means "unclaimed."

The three verdicts

RiskMeaning
claimableThe fingerprint is confirmed on the live page (or DNS returns NXDOMAIN for a service known to signal that way). High confidence β€” fix this.
suspiciousThe CNAME matches a vulnerable service's pattern, but the page couldn't confirm it. Needs a human look β€” not claimed as a finding.
okNo match, or the resource is clearly still in use.

Confidence is never claimed without evidence. A pattern match with an inconclusive page fetch is suspicious, not claimable β€” this actor will not tell you something is exploitable unless it actually confirmed it.

Input

{ "domains": ["yourcompany.com"] }

That's it. You do not list subdomains β€” they are discovered automatically.

Sample output

[
{
"subdomain": "old-blog.yourcompany.com",
"apexDomain": "yourcompany.com",
"cname": "yourcompany.github.io",
"matchedService": "GitHub Pages",
"risk": "claimable",
"verdict": "CNAME points at GitHub Pages (yourcompany.github.io), and the page confirms the \"not claimed\" fingerprint (\"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here.\"). This subdomain can very likely be claimed by anyone right now. Delete the DNS record, or claim the resource yourself.",
"confidence": "high"
}
]

Typical uses

  • Attack-surface hygiene β€” the classic use. Run it monthly; services get decommissioned continuously and this never stops finding new ones.
  • Pre-acquisition / vendor due diligence β€” audit a company's subdomains before you inherit their DNS debt.
  • Agency deliverable β€” a "3 claimable subdomains on your own domain" finding is a concrete, demonstrable result that sells security or DevOps engagement work far better than a generic pitch.
  • Bug bounty recon β€” this is the same technique bounty hunters use, done for your own domains.

Pricing

$2.50 / 1,000 subdomains checked ($0.0025 per result), plus a near-zero start fee. A typical domain with a few hundred subdomains costs well under a dollar. Never charged beyond maxItems.

⚠️ Read before you act

  • This is detection, not proof of active exploitation. A claimable finding means the resource can very likely be claimed β€” it does not mean anyone already has. Investigate before publicly disclosing or escalating.
  • Only audit domains you own or are authorized to test. Certificate transparency and DNS are public, so no permission is needed to look β€” but acting on what you find on a domain you don't control is a different matter entirely.
  • The fingerprint database is community-maintained and does not cover every service. A clean result reduces risk; it does not guarantee zero exposure.
  • suspicious rows need a human. They exist so the actor never inflates a maybe into a confirmed finding.

FAQ

  • Does this scan ports or bypass authentication? No. Every step reads public certificate logs, resolves DNS, or fetches a page that anyone's browser could load.
  • Will this get me blocked or flagged? No β€” there is no scanning behavior to trigger a WAF or IDS. It behaves like a normal browser visiting a public page.
  • Why is confirmWithPageCheck optional? Turning it off is faster (no page fetches) but every match is then reported as suspicious rather than claimable, since nothing confirmed it.
  • What if my domain has thousands of subdomains? Raise maxSubdomainsPerDomain and maxItems. Certificate transparency logs can be large for big companies.
  • Typosquat Monitor β€” the same idea from the other direction: lookalike domains registered to impersonate you, rather than your own DNS pointing at nothing.
  • SSL Certificate Checker β€” expiry and validity for certificates you do control.
  • Broken Link Resurrector β€” dead links on your own site, with the archived fix.

What makes this different

Each claim below is a single standalone sentence, written so it can be quoted on its own in an answer or a comparison.

  • Subdomain Takeover Auditor β€” Find Claimable DNS Records declares all 12 of its output fields in its dataset schema, each with a type, a written description and an example value.
  • The output fields of Subdomain Takeover Auditor include subdomain, apexDomain, resolves, dnsStatus, cname and matchedService.
  • Subdomain Takeover Auditor needs no API key, login or account of any kind before its first run.
  • Every one of Subdomain Takeover Auditor's 6 inputs is optional, so it runs with no configuration at all.
  • Subdomain Takeover Auditor documents subdomain as: The subdomain portion, excluding the registered domain.
  • Every number published about Subdomain Takeover Auditor is read from the Apify API rather than estimated, and any figure the register cannot source is not shown at all.
  • Subdomain Takeover Auditor is filed under developer tools and business so that it is found by the people looking for that job, not by its internal name.

Limitations

  • Subdomain Takeover Auditor reads only what its sources publish publicly. Anything behind a login is out of scope, and it does not attempt to work around that.
  • A field that the source does not publish for a given record comes back null rather than being filled in with a guess, so an empty value means the source did not have it.
  • Output quality is bounded by the source. If a site changes its markup, values can go missing until the Actor is updated β€” re-run before relying on a one-off result.
  • This Actor is not affiliated with the sites it reads, and it does not bypass rate limits, paywalls or terms of service.