OFAC Crypto Sanctions List — addresses, entities & programmes

Every crypto address on the U.S. OFAC SDN list, together with the sanctioned entity behind it and the programmes it was listed under.

Lists of sanctioned addresses are easy to find. What they don't tell you is whose address it is and why it is there — and that is the part a compliance decision actually rests on. This Actor parses Treasury's own 28 MB SDN file on every run and gives you the answer as a flat dataset:

TNiq9AXBp9EjUqhDhrwrfvAA8U3GUQZH81
  Tron · Entity · SDN UID 4632
  BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN  (Iran)
  programmes: IRAN, IFSR, IRGC, SDGT
  aka: CENTRAL BANK OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; BANK MARKAZI IRAN

What you get

Field	Meaning
address	The sanctioned address
chain	Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Solana, …
asset	Ticker exactly as OFAC labels it (XBT, ETH, TRX, USDT, …)
entity_name	Who the address belongs to
entity_type	Individual, Entity or Vessel
programs	Sanctions programmes, e.g. DPRK4, CYBER2, SDGT
country	Nationality or registered country, where OFAC states one
aka	Known aliases of the entity
sdn_uid	OFAC's own identifier, so you can trace back to the source record
remarks	OFAC's free-text note on the listing
list_published	Publication date of the list this run read

Current scale: ~1,000 addresses across 20 assets — Bitcoin 534, Tron 202, Ethereum 120, USDT 94, plus Litecoin, Monero, Zcash, Dash, Solana and others.

Use it three ways

1. Screen your own addresses. Put them into checkAddresses and every one comes back with a verdict — including the clean ones, marked sanctioned: false. That is usually the answer you need before accepting a payment.

2. Export the whole list. Leave the input empty to seed a screening database or a watchlist.

3. Slice by threat. Filter by programs to get only what matters to you — DPRK4 for North Korea, ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059 for narcotics, RUSSIA-EO14024, CYBER2 for cyber, SDGT/FTO for terrorism. Or filter by assets to get just the chains you support.

What the data shows

The list is dominated by a handful of large designations: 408 addresses under CYBER2, 206 under SDGT, 156 under narcotics authorities. Single entities can hold dozens — ISIL Khorasan accounts for 134 addresses, the Hydra darknet market for 117.

Thirteen addresses appear under more than one entity. That is not a duplicate: OFAC genuinely attributes them to several designated parties, and both rows are kept so you don't lose the second attribution.

Input

{
  "checkAddresses": [],
  "assets": [],
  "programs": [],
  "maxItems": 0
}

All fields are optional.

Source and limits

• Read live from Treasury's official SDN file on every run — not a mirror, not a cached snapshot. list_published tells you exactly which edition you got.
• SDN only. OFAC's separate Consolidated (non-SDN) list is not included yet.
• Sanctions ≠ guilt of the counterparty holding a similar address. A hit means the address itself is designated; dealing with it is prohibited for U.S. persons and blocked by most exchanges. Absence from the list is not a clean bill of health — it only means this one list does not name it.
• This is data, not legal advice.

Who builds this

Made by AMLConsensus — wallet screening that checks an address against several independent sources at once (OFAC SDN, stablecoin issuer freeze lists, sanctions oracles, open blacklists) and shows which source flagged what, instead of returning one vendor's number.

See also our Stablecoin Freeze Tracker — every address frozen by Tether or Circle.

Questions, bulk volume or a dataset you need that isn't here: support@amlconsensus.com