Domain-Layer Against Origin-Layer Outage Triage Receipt

This Actor finds which layer failed when a site is down. It gives one dataset row for each hostname.

Failed-layer classes

The Actor checks the layers in this order. It reports the first layer that fails.

Class	Meaning
registration_hold	RDAP shows client hold, server hold, pending delete, or redemption period.
parking_delegation	A nameserver or the SOA name matches a parking or suspension pattern.
sinkhole_dns	A resolver answer is loopback, unspecified, private, or reserved.
dns_no_answer	Both resolvers give no A or AAAA answer.
tls	The HTTPS probe through DNS fails in the TLS handshake.
dns_path_mismatch	HTTPS through DNS fails, but the origin answers when the hostname is forced.
origin	HTTPS through DNS fails, and no direct probe passes.
none	HTTPS through DNS returns the expected status.
invalid_hostname	The input hostname is not a valid public name. No charge.
triage_error	An unexpected error occurred for this hostname. No charge.

Input

Field	Default	Limit
hostnames	["example.com"]	Maximum 50. IP addresses and private names are rejected.
known_origin_ips	{}	Map of hostname to public IPs. Maximum 4 for each hostname.
health_path	/	Must start with /.
expected_status	200	100 to 599.

An empty input {} runs the default input and succeeds.

Output

Each row has these fields:

• hostname, failed_layer, evidence (list of text lines), checked_at
• rdap: status, last_changed, error
• nameservers, soa_owner, soa_mname, parking_match
• resolvers: for 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8, the rcode, a, and aaaa answers
• sinkhole: true if any answer is loopback or non-public
• https_via_dns: probe result for the first public DNS answer
• https_direct: one probe result for each known origin IP, with the hostname forced
• rejected_origin_ips: input origin IPs that were not public

A failed gate, an unreachable target, or a zero-finding result is a dataset row. The run still succeeds.

Billing event

The Actor calls Actor.charge once for each hostname triaged, with the event hostname_triage (count 1).

• Invalid hostnames and triage_error rows are not charged.
• If the charge limit is reached, the Actor stops and reports this in the status message.
• The Actor does not set a price. The price is set by the operator in the Apify Console.

Safety limits

• HTTP only. No browser, proxy, LLM, paid API, database, or secret.
• Input: 50 hostnames, 4 origin IPs for each hostname, 5 hostnames in parallel.
• Each hostname: 1 RDAP request, up to 6 DNS queries, up to 5 HTTPS probes.
• HTTPS probe: 10 s timeout, no redirects, 64 KB read limit.
• RDAP: HTTPS only, 3 redirects at most, 256 KB limit. Each redirect target must be public.
• Probes connect only to public IPs. Loopback, private, and reserved addresses are never contacted.

Limits and risks

• The parking pattern list in src/classify.py needs regular updates.
• The RDAP name is the SOA owner name, or the last two labels if no SOA exists. This can be wrong for some multi-label public suffixes.
• Redirect hosts for RDAP are checked by name, not by resolved address.
• Competition in the Store is unknown.

Local use

uv run pytest
uv run ruff check .