Routine data-only rebuilds (scheduled, see the README) are not listed here.
- Security: a separate signature file now has to cover the document you send. Before, a valid signature over
some other content (e.g. an unrelated signed XML file) could be reported as
ALLOW next to an unsigned document;
now that is BLOCK ("this signature does not cover the file you gave").
- Plain XML signatures with a single reference (common for signed XML files) are now validated instead of being
reported as "could not process".
- A signature covering several files (e.g. contract + annexes) checked with only one of them gives
REVIEW (the
others weren't provided), no longer a false BLOCK. Unsupported XML transforms give REVIEW instead of BLOCK.
- Revocation downloads are capped in size;
data: URLs are accepted for base64 inputs.
- Signed XML and separate signature files: XAdES / XML-DSig signatures are validated, enveloped (a signed XML
file) or detached (your document plus its
.xml signature, via signature_url / signature_base64). The output
says whether your document matches what was signed (document_match).
- Authentic EU law:
eu_act (CELEX or ELI) + language checks an Official Journal act against the Publications
Office's qualified e-seal, with the official PDF or your own copy.
- Long-term validation for XML signatures: a certificate that has expired since is validated at the signature
timestamp, using the revocation data in the signature.
- Revocation and certificate lookups taken from a document only go to public internet addresses.
- The EU trusted lists are now rebuilt and republished every Sunday (about 05:30 Amsterdam time); the README
explains how current they are (
trusted_lists.built_at) and how revocation is checked.
- Apify Console: using batch mode or an upload no longer fails because the prefilled example value is submitted too (an example
you didn't change is ignored; a value you typed yourself plus a batch is still reported as ambiguous).
- Downloads have a total time limit (a server sending data very slowly can no longer hold a run), and the
connection itself is checked to be a public address (protection against DNS rebinding).
- Your "maximum charge per run" is checked before each result is delivered, so the run stops cleanly at your limit.
- A signer certificate must allow signing (digital signature or non-repudiation key usage); certificates meant only
for encryption no longer pass as valid signatures.
- Contracts signed by several parties: a later signature no longer puts the earlier ones on REVIEW
(
changed_after_signing: LATER_SIGNATURES). A document certified as "no changes allowed" still gets BLOCK.
- Large documents: at most 25 signatures are validated per PDF, each PDF has a 3-minute budget, and every result is
saved as soon as it is ready, so a long run never loses finished results.
- Damaged PDFs (corrupt streams, broken structure) now always return "unreadable PDF" instead of failing the run.
- URLs that point to private, local or reserved network addresses are refused, also after a redirect.
- Valid signatures and seals whose long-term proof is incomplete are now checked against the certificate's current
status, so currently valid qualified seals and signatures get ALLOW (e.g. official gazette seals, Belgian eID).
- Signatures in the legacy SHA-1 format (still used by some official gazettes) are reported with their signer and
get REVIEW, instead of the PDF being called unsigned.
- Valid seals that use a less common but standard-compliant RSA encoding are no longer reported as invalid.
- First public release: PDF signature and seal validation against the EU trusted lists, with signer, qualified
status, trust provider, changes after signing, and an ALLOW / REVIEW / BLOCK verdict.
